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THE YIELD OF THE FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL  income  tax increased  from $55.4 
billion  in fiscal  year  1966  to an estimated  $103.3  billion  in fiscal  year  1973. 
This is an increase  of $47.9 billion over a period  during  which  personal 
income  from  production-henceforth  to be identified  as adjusted  personal 
income-rose $357.2  billion,' suggesting  a marginal  rate on the increased 
income-or built-in  flexibility-of about 13.5  percent.  The  built-in  flexibil- 
ity so computed  is only the roughest  of approximations,  since  it does not 
allow  for the changes  in the tax structure  that  took place  during  the period. 
Although  tax  rates  were  the  same  at the  beginning  and  the  end  of the  period, 
a number  of major  structural  changes  that  affect  revenues  in both  directions 
were  enacted  in 1969  and 1971.2  The  purpose  of this  paper  is to measure  the 
Note: The work on this paper  was supported  by a grant from the RANN Program 
of the National Science  Foundation.  I am indebted  to Robert  E. Litan for his assistance 
in the regression  analysis,  to Catherine  Armington  for programming  the simulation  ex- 
ercises on the tax file, and to Nancy Teeters  for the use of her individual  income tax 
data bank. 
1. Personal  income from production  is personal  income less transfer  payments  plus 
personal contributions  for social insurance.  The increase is measured  from calendar 
year 1965 to calendar  year 1972, since fiscal year receipts  depend  primarily  on income 
in the previous  calendar  year. 
2. The most important  changes were increases  in the per capita exemption  and the 
percentage  standard  deduction,  the introduction  of a new low-income  allowance,  an in- 
crease  in the maximum  tax rate on capital  gains  from 25 to 35 percent,  a new 10 percent 
tax on tax preferences,  and a maximum marginal  tax rate of 50 percent for earned 
income. 
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built-in  flexibility  of the federal  individual  income  tax as it applies  to in- 
comes  received  in 1973  and later  years. 
In the past, measures  of the built-in  flexibility  of the income  tax have 
been estimated  from regressions  based on time series  data, using various 
statistical  techniques  to correct  for the effect  of changes  in the tax law.3  It 
is now possible  to make  such  estimates,  through  simulation,  on the basis  of 
the Internal  Revenue  Service  tax file, which  contains  the income and tax 
information  for a random,  stratified  sample  of federal  individual  income 
tax returns.4  The calculations  based on the tax file have two advantages: 
first,  they automatically  reflect  the effect  of changes  in the distribution  of 
taxable  income that occur when incomes  change;  and, second, they can 
take  into account  the effects  of changes  in the tax law with  a relatively  high 
degree  of accuracy.  In this paper,  the 1970  tax file is used  to prepare  esti- 
mates  of the built-in  flexibility  of the income  tax under  conditions  of sus- 
tained  growth  and  during  periods  of cyclical  instability,  and  these  estimates 
are compared  with those based  on the time series  analysis. 
Structure  of the Income  Tax 
The features  of the income  tax structure  that have a significant  bearing 
on its revenue  yield  are  (1) the definition  of income  for tax purposes,  (2) the 
allowable  personal  deductions,  (3) the personal  exemptions,  and  (4) the tax 
rates.  Detailed  data  for each  of these  features,  which  are  available  annually 
from U.S. Internal  Revenue  Service,  Statistics  of Income,  are shown in 
Appendix  Table  A-1  for  the  period  1947  through  1971;  they  are  summarized 
in Table 1. 
3. See, for example,  Joseph A. Pechman,  "Yield of the Individual  Income  Tax dur- 
ing a Recession,"  in Policies to Combat  Depression,  A Conference  of the Universities- 
National Bureau  Committee  for Economic  Research  (Princeton  University  Press  for the 
National Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1956),  pp. 123-45; E. Cary  Brown  and Richard 
J. Kruizenga,  "Income Sensitivity  of  a Simple Personal  Income Tax," Review  of Eco- 
nomics  and  Statistics,  Vol. 41 (August 1959),  pp. 260-69; and William  H. Waldorf,  "The 
Responsiveness  of Federal  Personal  Income Taxes to Income Change,"  Survey  of Cur- 
rent  Business,  Vol. 47 (December  1967),  pp. 32-45. 
4. For a detailed  description  of the tax file and its uses, see Joseph  A. Pechman,  "A 
New Tax Model for Revenue  Estimating,"  in Alan T. Peacock  and Gerald  Hauser  (eds.), 
Government  Finance and Economic Development  (Paris: Organisation  for Economic 
Co-operation  and Development, 1965), pp.  231-44 (Brookings  Reprint 102). The full 
sample  contains over 90,000 returns,  but for the calculations  in this paper a subsample 
of 10,000  returns  was adequate.  The differences  in the estimates  based on several  exper- 
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Table 1. Selected Features of the Federal Individual  Income Tax Structure, 
1947-71 
Personal 
Adjusted  Percent  of  deductions 
gross in-  adjusted  as a percent  Taxable  Average 
come as a  gross in-  of adjusted  Average  income  as a  effective 
percent  of  come not  gross in-  value  of  percent  of  rate of tax 
adjusted  reported  come re-  personal  adjusted  on taxable 
personal  onz  tax  ported  on  exemptionsb personal  income 
Year  incomea  returns  tax returns  (dollars)  income  (percent) 
1947  94.5  12.9  11.8  539  41.5  24.0 
1948  92.0  11.7  11.9  647  37.1  20.6 
1949  92.9  12.3  12.4  648  36.3  20.2 
1950  93.5  11.1  12.2  649  39.1  21.8 
1951  92.3  11.2  12.5  650  40.2  24.4 
1952  91.4  10.6  12.7  651  40.7  25.9 
1953  91.5  10.3  13.0  651  41.0  25.7 
1954  90.6  9.4  13.4  652  41.3  23.2 
1955  91.4  9.1  13.5  653  42.8  23.1 
1956  91.6  8.9  13.6  653  44.1  23.1 
1957  91.0  8.5  14.1  654  44.4  23.0 
1958  90.6  9.6  14.5  654  43.5  23.0 
1959  91.2  8.5  14.9  655  45.6  23.2 
1960  90.5  8.8  15.3  655  44.9  23.0 
1961  91.0  8.2  15.6  656  46.0  23.2 
1962  90.4  8.3  15.7  656  46.4  23.0 
1963  90.3  7.8  16.1  656  47.2  23.1 
1964  90.9  8.1  16.9  657  48.5  20.5 
1965  90.9  8.1  16.6  657  49.7  19.4 
1966  90.9  8.4  16.3  657  50.9  19.6 
1967  91.2  7.7  16.2  658  52.5  20.0 
1968  91.6  7.4  16.5  658  53.9  20.3c 
1969  90.7  6.8  16.9  659  54.5  20.30 
1970  89.6  6.9  19.1  687  53.0  20.40 
1971  90.0  6.6  20.7  742  51.6  20.6 
Source: Appendix Table A-1. 
a. Adjusted personal income is personal income less transfer payments plus personal contributions for 
social insurance. 
b.  Does not include special exemption for blindness. 
c.  Excludes surcharge. 
The relationship  between  the amount of income reported  for tax pur- 
poses-called adjusted  gross income  under the federal  income tax-and 
adjusted  personal  income as measured  by the Department  of Commerce 
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adjusted  gross  income declined  from 94.5 percent  to 90.6 percent  of ad- 
justed  personal  income;  thereafter,  it moved erratically  between  89.6 and 
91.6 percent.  These  movements  were  due partly  to the volatility  of capital 
gains,  which  are  included  in adjusted  gross  income  but are  excluded  from 
adjusted  personal  income,  and  partly  to the difficulties  of correcting  for the 
differences  between  the two concepts.5 
Since  not all income  recipients  are required  to file tax returns  and not 
everybody  reports  his income accurately,  adjusted  gross  income  reported 
on tax returns  is lower  than the aggregate  for all recipients.  However,  the 
gap has been declining  over the years,  as incomes  have grown  and more 
and more  people  have  moved  above  the minimum  filing  requirements.6  In 
1947,  12.9  percent  of total adjusted  gross  income  was not reported  on tax 
returns;  by 1971  the percentage  was down  to 6.6 percent.7 
Between  1947  and 1971,  the personal  deductions  reported  on all tax re- 
turns rose from 11.8 percent  to 20.7 percent  of adjusted  gross income. 
There  were  only relatively  minor  statutory  changes  in the allowable  deduc- 
tions between  1947  and 1963,  but the ratio of personal  deductions  to in- 
come rose sharply  in that period mainly because  of the tremendous  in- 
creases  in itemized  deductions  associated  with  the broadened  incidence  of 
home ownership.  Further  increases  in the ratio of personal  deductions  to 
income  occurred  in 1964,  when  the minimum  standard  deduction  was en- 
acted;  in 1970,  when  the minimum  standard  deduction  was supplemented 
by a low-income  allowance;  and  in 1971,  when  a flat  low-income  allowance 
replaced  the minimum  standard  deduction  and the percentage  standard 
deduction  was raised.8 
5. A detailed reconciliation  between  personal  income and adjusted  gross income is 
prepared  periodically  by the Bureau  of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department  of 
Commerce.  The last published  estimates  are given in "The Relationship  between  Per- 
sonal Income and Taxable Income," Survey  of Current  Business,  Vol. 50 (May 1970), 
pp. 19-21. I am grateful  to the Bureau  of Economic Analysis for making  available  to 
me its most recent  revised  estimates. 
6. Even though their incomes  are below the filing requirements,  many  income recip- 
ients file returns  to obtain refunds. 
7. This suggests  that the amount of underreporting  is quite moderate.  It is probably 
no more than half the adjusted  gross income not reported  on tax returns,  or less than 
3.5 percent. 
8. The percentage  standard  deduction,  which was enacted  in 1944,  was originally  10 
percent  of income up to a maximum  of $1,000. It was raised  to 13 percent  with a maxi- 
mum  of $1,500  in 1971  and to 15 percent  with a maximum  of $2,000  for 1972  and later 
years.  The minimum  standard  deduction,  which was introduced  in 1964, began  at $200 
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The personal  exemption  was $500 per capita  in 1947;  it was raised  to 
$600  in 1948  and  remained  at that  level  until  it was  raised  to $625  for 1970, 
$675 for 1971,  and $750 for 1972 and later  years.  Beginning  in 1948,  an 
extra  exemption  was  given  to taxpayers  and their  spouses  who are  65 years 
of age or older  or blind.  The  value  of the exemptions  per  person  in the pop- 
ulation  crept up between  1947 and 1969, the period when the statutory 
exemptions  remained  unchanged,  because  the proportion  of aged  persons 
in the population  increased.  Larger  increases  occurred  in 1948,  1970,  and 
1971,  when  the per capita  exemption  was increased. 
Although  the statutory  increases  in personal  deductions  and exemptions 
have  taken  large  chunks  out of the tax base from  time  to time,  taxable  in- 
come has increased  substantially  in relation  to adjusted  personal  income. 
Since 1947, the ratio has actually  declined  in years when the statutory 
exemptions  or deductions  were  raised  (1948,  1970,  and 1971)  or in years  of 
recession  (1949  and 1958);  in all other  years  except  1960,  the ratio  moved 
up-sometimes sharply-as more  and more  taxpayers  crossed  the taxable 
income  threshold.  As a result,  taxable  income  on all returns  rose  from  41.5 
percent  of adjusted  personal  income  in 1947  to a peak of 54.5 percent  in 
1969,  and then declined  to 53.0 percent  in 1970  and 51.6 percent  in 1971. 
The tax rates, which are graduated  by a bracket  system, have been 
changed  ten times since 1947.9  Aside from variations  in the rates  them- 
selves,  three significant  structural  changes  that affected  the progressivity 
of the income  tax were  made  during  this period:  First,  in 1948,  the intro- 
duction  of income splitting  in effect  doubled  the width of the taxable  in- 
come brackets  for married  couples.10  Second,  in 1964,  the first  taxable  in- 
come bracket,  zero to $2,000,  was split  into four $500 brackets.  Third,  in 
1969, a special  rate schedule  was enacted  for single  persons  who are not 
heads  of households  to limit  their  tax to no more  than  20 percent  above  the 
mented  by the low-income allowance  which varied  with the number  of exemptions  and 
the size of income; together,  the minimum  standard  deduction  and the low-income  al- 
lowance were limited to a maximum  of $1,100. In 1971,  the minimum  standard  deduc- 
tion was removed  and the low-income allowance was converted  to a flat $1,050 for 
1971 and $1,300 for 1972  and later years. 
9. Changes  in rates were made in 1948, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1954, 1964, and 1965. In 
addition, surcharges  of 7.5 percent  in 1968, 10 percent  in 1969,  and 2.5 percent in 1970 
were applied to taxable  income brackets  above $1,000. 
10. In 1951, a separate  rate schedule was adopted for heads of households  to give 
them approximately  half the advantage  of income splitting. The revenue  effect of this 
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tax paid by married  couples  with the same taxable  income.  Mainly as a 
result  of these  changes,  the average  effective  rates  of tax have  varied  from 
a low of 19.4 percent  in 1965  to a high of 25.9 percent  in 1952  (Table 1, 
last column).  Perhaps  the most interesting  feature  of the series  on effective 
rates  is that,  despite  the  rise  in incomes  during  the period  1954-63  when  the 
tax rates  remained  unchanged,  the average  effective  rate  was virtually  con- 
stant.  By contrast,  between  1965  and 1971,  when  the rates  (exclusive  of sur- 
charge)  also remained  unchanged,  the effective  rate  rose by an average  of 
0.2 percentage  point per year.11 
Built-in  Flexibility  Based  on Historical  Data 
Despite  the numerous  changes  that have  taken  place  in the structure  of 
the income  tax in the last twenty-five  years,  an attempt  to infer  the built-in 
flexibility  of the income tax from the historical  record  is not a hopeless 
exercise.  Brown  and Kruizenga  developed  a relatively  simple  formula  to 
estimate  the individual  income  tax base  from  aggregate  data  for the period 
1929-53,  and  Waldorf  later  applied  the same  formula  to data  for 1947-65 
with considerable  success.12  To estimate  tax liabilities,  Waldorf  added a 
rate  variable  to his equation,  but he did not succeed  in capturing  the effect 
of changes  in the  rate  of graduation  when  the schedule  of tax  rates  changed. 
As will soon be noted, additional  years  of data have made it possible  to 
estimate  tax liabilities  as well as taxable  income  from past data. 
The Brown-Kruizenga  formula  is based  on the hypothesis  that the frac- 
tion of personal  income  that  appears  in the tax base  varies  directly  with  per 
capita  income  and inversely  with per capita  exemptions.  Personal  income 
includes  many items that are not taxable  (mainly  transfer  payments  and 
fringe  benefits)  and excludes  some that are taxable  (mainly  capital  gains 
and employee  payroll  taxes).  Consequently,  adjusted  personal  income or 
estimated  adjusted  gross  income  is used  for the per  capita  income  variable. 
Exemptions  are estimated  from mid-year  population  figures,  giving two 
exemptions  for persons  65 years  of age and over  and one exemption  for the 
11. Throughout  this paper, the effective rates are computed without regard  to the 
surcharge  that was in effect  in 1968, 1969,  and 1970.  Since the basic rates were  the same 
throughout  the period,  the rise in the average  effective  rate ontaxable income  from 1965 
to 1971 was due entirely  to the upward  shift in the distribution  of income. 
12. Brown and Kruizenga,  "Income  Sensitivity  of a Simple Personal  Income Tax," 
and Waldorf,  "Responsiveness  of Federal  Personal  Income  Taxes." Joseph A. Pechman  391 
remaining  population.13  Although  personal  deductions  are a major ele- 
ment  in determining  taxable  income,  they are too closely  correlated  with 
aggregate  income  to be used as an independent  variable  in estimating  tax- 
able  income. 
Since  the tax base  cannot  exceed  the total amount  of income  received  by 
the entire  population,  it is appropriate  to constrain  the maximum  ratio of 
taxable  income  to total income  to unity.'4  This  is done  by "explaining"  the 
log of the proportion  of total income  that is not taxable  rather  than the 
portion  that is taxable. 
A description  of the  methods  used  to fit  the Brown-Kruizenga  formula  to 
the 1947-71  data  and of the experiments  to improve  on it are given  in the 
appendix.  The original  formula-which related  the log of the nontaxable 
portion  of adjusted  personal  income  to adjusted  personal  income  per  capita 
and exemptions  per capita-held up well, but the results  were  improved 
somewhat  by adding  capital  gains  per  capita  as an additional  independent 
variable.  The  final  equation  for taxable  income  is shown  as equation  (3) in 
the appendix. 
To estimate  tax liabilities,  several  departures  were  made  from  the tech- 
nique  Waldorf  used for the earlier  data. Waldorf  expressed  tax liabilities 
as a function  of taxable  income,  the tax rate  on the first  $2,000  of taxable 
income  (the proxy  variable  for the entire  rate  structure),  and dummy  vari- 
ables  for the years  in which  the rates  were  altered.15  The drawback  to this 
approach  was that, since  numerous  changes  were  made  in the tax law be- 
tween  1947  and 1965,  Waldorf  found  it necessary  to include  a large  number 
of dummy  variables  relative  to the number  of data observations  available. 
He was  also handicapped  in having  only  two observations-1964  and 1965 
-to  measure  the effect  of the Revenue  Act of 1964. 
Considerable  experimentation  identified  three major changes  in Wal- 
dorf's  methods  needed  to estimate  tax liabilities  within  a satisfactory  mar- 
gin of error.  First,  the period  of estimation  was shortened  from 1947-71  to 
1954-71  to avoid the use of dummy  variables  for the different  tax rate 
13. The number  of blind people is small, so the special exemption  for blindness  is 
ignored. 
14. It is conceivable  that income subject  to tax could exceed  personal  income. How- 
ever,  the portion  of personal  income that is not taxable  greatly  exceeds  the taxable  items 
that are excluded. Brown and Kruizenga experimented  with higher and lower con- 
straints,  but concluded  that unity is the most satisfactory  ratio. 
15. For a more complete description  of Waldorf's estimating procedure,  and the 
techniques  used to update  his results,  see the appendix. 392  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
schedules  between  1947 and 1953.16  Second,  a new variable  was used to 
represent  the various  tax rate  schedules.  In place  of the tax rate  applying  to 
the first $2,000  of taxable  income,  an average  tax rate was computed  by 
weighting  the actual  rates  for a particular  year by the taxable  income  in 
each bracket  in 1967.17  Third,  another  taxable  income  variable,  assuming 
the value  of zero prior  to 1964,  was introduced  to account  for the rise  in 
the average  effective  tax rate on taxable  income over  the 1965-71  period. 
As indicated  earlier,  the effective  rate  was surprisingly  constant  during  the 
1954-63  years,  but began  a gradual  upward  climb  beginning  in 1965,  when 
the  Revenue  Act of 1964  became  fully  effective.  The  rise  in the  average  effec- 
tive rate between  1965  and 1971  was certainly  due to the accelerated  up- 
ward  movement  in the distribution  of income  by rate classes,  induced  by 
the sustained  and  significant  rise  in personal  incomes  over  these  years.  This 
hypothesis  was confirmed  by the high degree  of statistical  significance  at- 
tached  to the coefficient  on this additional  taxable  income  variable.  More- 
over,  the final  tax liabilities  equation  (equation  6 in the appendix)  yielded 
an extremely  close fit and very  low residuals,  as can be observed  in Table 
A-2 of the appendix. 
Table  2 summarizes  estimates,  based  on equations  (3) and  (6), of the re- 
sponsiveness  of the income  tax to changes  in income  for the years  1954-71 
by two different  measures.  The first  is built-in  flexibility,  which  measures 
the absolute  increase  (decrease)  in tax liabilities  for every  dollar  increase 
(decrease)  in adjusted  personal  income. The second is elasticity,  which 
measures  the percentage  change  in tax liabilities  when adjusted  personal 
income  rises  by 1 percent.  The  built-in  flexibility  measure  is useful  in evalu- 
ating  the stabilizing  effect  of the  income  tax  in terms  of absolute  changes  in 
income;  if the analysis  is in terms  of percentage  change,  elasticity  is more 
useful.18 
The first  column  of Table  2 shows  estimates  of the built-in  flexibility  of 
the tax base with respect  to adjusted  personal  income.  These  figures  tell a 
familiar  story:  except  for 1970  and 1971,  when  exemptions  were  increased, 
a larger  and larger  percentage  of the annual  increment  in income  was in- 
16. Coupled  with the other modifications,  this change  in the data period  resulted  in 
the presence  of only one dummy,  for the 1954-63 years,  in the final equation. 
17. The use of 1967  for weighting  purposes  is arbitrary.  The only requirements  were 
that the year should represent  the post-1964  tax brackets  and that it should not be a 
terminal  year. 
18. The two measures  are related. Elasticity may be obtained by dividing built-in 
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Table 2.  Built-in Flexibility and Elasticity of the Federal Individual 
Income Tax, by Selected Tax and Income Measures, 1954-71 
Built-in flexibilityr  Elasticityb 
Taxable  Tax 
Taxable  Tax  income with  Tax  liabilities 
income to  Tax  liabilities  respect to  liabilities  with respect 
adjusted  liabilities  to adjusted  adjusted  with respect  to adjusted 
personal  to taxable  personal  personal  to taxable  personal 
Year  incomec  income  incomec  incomec  income  income0 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1954  0.589  0.230  0.136  1.42  1.00  1.42 
1955  0.599  0.230  0.138  1.39  1.00  1.39 
1956  0.605  0.230  0.139  1.38  1.00  1.38 
1957  0.605  0.230  0.139  1.38  1.00  1.38 
1958  0.607  0.230  0.139  1.38  1.00  1.38 
1959  0.616  0.230  0.141  1.36  1.00  1.36 
1960  0.617  0.230  0.142  1.35  1.00  1.35 
1961  0.623  0.230  0.143  1.34  1.00  1.34 
1962  0.625  0.229  0.143  1.34  1.00  1.34 
1963  0.630  0.229  0.144  1.33  1.00  1.33 
1964  0.638  0.238  0.152  1.32  1.12  1.48 
1965  0.647  0.224  0.145  1.30  1.12  1.46 
1966  0.655  0.227  0.149  1.29  1.12  1.44 
1967  0.664  0.230  0.152  1.27  1.12  1.43 
1968  0.674  0.233d  0.157d  1.26  1.12d  1.41d 
1969  0.679  0.236d  0.160d  1.25  1.12d  1.40d 
1970  0.665  0.237d  0.158d  1.27  1.12d  1.43d 
1971  0.664  0.238  0.158  1.27  1.12  1.43 
Sources: Columns (1) and (4) are developed from appendix equation (3) and columns (2) and (5) from 
equation (6); column (3)  = (1) X (2); column (6)  =  (4)  X (5). The calculations are made from data before 
rounding. 
a.  Built-in flexibility is the ratio of the absolute increase (decrease)  in tax liabilities to the absolute increase 
(decrease) in adjusted personal income. 
b. Elasticity is the ratio of the percentage change in tax liabilities to the percentage change in adjusted 
personal income. 
c.  Adjusted personal income is personal income less transfer payments plus personal contributions for 
social insurance. 
d. Tax liabilities exclude surcharge  in 1968-70. 
cluded in taxable  income. By 1971, about two-thirds  of the increase  in 
adjusted  personal  income was subject  to tax. The second column shows 
the  remarkably  constant  marginal  tax  rate  on taxable  income  for the period 
1954-63,  and the subsequent  upward  drift  in the marginal  rate from the 
second  taxable  income  variable  which  was added  to the tax liabilities  equa- 
tion to capture  the post-1964  developments.  The marginal  rate on taxable 
income  rose  when  the Revenue  Act of 1964  was  enacted,  but then  declined 394  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
the following  year.  A possible  explanation  for this phenomenon  is that, in 
1964,  the effect  of the large  upward  movement  in income  and the four-way 
split of the bottom bracket  more than offset  the effect  of the rate reduc- 
tions. Only  in 1965,  with  the split  first  bracket  already  in effect,  could  yet 
another  set of rate  reductions  lower  built-in  flexibility.  The rise thereafter 
is an indication  that-unlike the experience  in 1954-63-as incomes  con- 
tinued  to increase,  the marginal  tax of those already  taxable  exceeded  the 
marginal  tax of those who became  taxable  for the first  time. To generate 
estimates  of the built-in  flexibility  of tax liabilities  with  respect  to adjusted 
personal  income,  the  first  two  columns  of Table  2 need  merely  be multiplied 
together.  According  to these  estimates,  even  though  the tax rates  had  been 
reduced  significantly,  the  individual  income  tax took nearly  $1.6  billion  out 
of every  $10  billion  increase  in income  at the  end  of the period,  as compared 
with  less than $1.4 billion  at the beginning. 
The fourth  column  of Table  2 presents  the elasticity  of taxable  income 
with  respect  to adjusted  personal  income.  This  elasticity  declined  from  1.42 
to 1.25  as incomes  rose  between  1954  and 1969,  and  then  increased  to 1.27 
in 1970  and 1971  in response  to the adoption  of the low-income  allowance 
and the increases  in the statutory  exemption.'9  The elasticity  of tax liabili- 
ties with  respect  to taxable  income  is shown  in the  fifth  column  of the table. 
For convenience,  this elasticity  is rounded  from  0.995 (the value  of the re- 
gression  coefficient  on taxable  income  in the second  equation)  to unity  for 
the 1954-63  years.  The second  taxable  income  variable  raised  the elasticity 
value  for  the  tax  rate  on taxable  income  to 1.12  for  the 1964-71  period.  The 
elasticity  of tax liabilities  with respect  to adjusted  personal  income  is the 
product  of the elasticity  estimates  in the fourth  and fifth  columns,  shown 
in the last column.  Although  this final elasticity  varied  between  1.33  and 
1.48  over  the years  listed,  it was almost  the same  at the end as at the begin- 
ning of the period. 
Projected  Liabilities  under  Conditions  of Sustained  Growth 
Given  the regressions  derived  from  the 1954-71  data, it is now possible 
to project  the revenue  yield of the individual  income  tax in future  years. 
19. The low-income  allowance  and the higher  exemptions  reduced  the average  ratio 
of taxable  income to personal  income, but it probably  did not change  the marginal  ratio 
significantly.  Since the elasticity  is the ratio of the marginal  to the average  ratio, the 
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The  reliability  of the projection  depends  heavily  on whether  the additional 
taxable  income  variable  in the tax liability  equation  accurately  represents 
the effect  on tax liabilities  of the shift  that occurs  in the absolute  distribu- 
tion of income  when  incomes  change.  To make  this  test,  income  tax liabili- 
ties  were  estimated  for  the period  1973-95  on the  basis  of simulations  of the 
1970  tax file and of projections  based on the 1954-71  regressions,  using 
the same  assumptions  regarding  the growth  of incomes  and of population. 
Both  sets of long-term  estimates  begin  with  projections  based  on known 
income  developments  in 1972  and  estimates  for 1973.20  Thereafter,  per  cap- 
ita adjusted  personal  income and per capita adjusted  gross  income  were 
increased  at constant  annual  rates  of 4, 5, 6, 8, and 10  percent.2'  Population 
was assumed  to increase  at an annual  rate of 1 percent  throughout  the 
period,  but exemptions  per  capita  and per  tax return  were  kept  at the 1971 
levels. 
In making  projections  on the  tax  file,  several  additional  assumptions  were 
necessary  to simulate  the relationship  between  the growth  in total income 
per  capita  and  the tax liabilities  on individual  returns.  First,  adjusted  gross 
incomes on all tax returns  were increased  proportionately  beginning  in 
1973,  on the assumption  that the Lorenz  curve  for the distribution  of in- 
come would  remain  unchanged.22  Second,  itemized  deductions  on returns 
that used them  were  assumed  to have an elasticity  of 1.05  with respect  to 
income.23  Third,  one out of four returns  with standard  deductions  that 
were  raised  above  the $10,000  level in any year was switched  to itemized 
deductions.  The amount  of deductions  attributed  to such returns  was the 
20. Adjusted  personal  income  was obtained  from the current  estimates  based on offi- 
cial national income accounts for 1972 and then raised  7.6 percent  per capita in 1973. 
To reflect  the movements  in the stock market,  realized  capital gains were assumed  to 
increase  by 50 percent  in 1972 and then to decline  by 40 percent  in 1973. 
21. No distinction  is made  at this point between  income growth  due to growth  of real 
income and income growth due to inflation.  For the effect of inflation,  see the section 
on inflationary  conditions,  below. 
22. The effect of changes  in the relative  distribution  of income that arise as a result 
of differential  changes  in the rate of growth  of wages, capital  gains, and other property 
income during  periods  of inflation  is explored  in the section on inflationary  conditions. 
23. This may well be too high for the future,  since the ratio of deductions  to income 
on itemized  returns  varied  within a narrow  range between  1964  and 1969,  the most re- 
cent period during  which there was no statutory  change  in deductions.  (Statistics  of In- 
come-1964,  Individual Income Tax Returns, Table M, p. 38, and Statistics  of Income- 
1969, Individual Income Tax Returns, Table 2.3, pp. 88, 90.) Test runs indicate that even 
if the elasticity were raised to an unlikely 1.1, the built-in flexibility  estimates on the 
tax file would be virtually unaffected  for 1975 and would be reduced by only about 
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standard  deduction  plus 1 percent  of the new adjusted  gross income.24 
Fourth,  the number  of tax returns  filed  was  increased  at the rate  of 1.1  per- 
cent per year.  This assumption  was designed  to expand  the proportion  of 
total income reported  on tax returns  as incomes  grew, but to keep the 
relative  distribution  of income  in the tax return  population  unchanged.25 
Three  major  changes  have  been  made  in the  income  tax  law  since  the end 
of 1971,  when  the historical  data  terminate-all of them  effective  for 1972 
and  later  years.  The  per  capita  exemption  was  increased  from  $675  to $750; 
the percentage  standard  deduction  was increased  from 13 percent  of in- 
come  up  to a maximum  of $1,500,  to 15  percent  of income  up  to a maximum 
of $2,000;  and  the  low-income  allowance  was  raised  from  $1,050  to $1,300. 
The  projections  based  on the tax file  were  easily  programmed  to accommo- 
date these changes.  The regressions  based on the historical  data include 
exemptions  as an independent  variable,  but the effect  of the personal  de- 
ductions  could not be measured  because  of their close correlation  to ag- 
gregate  income.  Accordingly,  the revised  Waldorf  equations  based  on the 
data  for 1954-71  were  used  without  any allowance  for the 1972  changes  in 
the personal  deductions.26 
To test the predictive  ability  of the tax file,  an experiment  was  run  to see 
whether  it accurately  "backcasted"  the  constant  average  tax  rate  on taxable 
24. The proportion  of returns  above the $10,000  income level using  itemized  deduc- 
tions was already very high in 1970-about  75 percent for returns with incomes of 
$10,000  to $15,000  and 91 percent  for returns  above $15,000  (Statistics  ofIncome-1970, 
Individual  Income  Tax Returns,  Chart  2A, p. 102).  Consequently,  the estimates  of built-in 
flexibility  are not very sensitive to the assumption  made with regard  to those returns 
that switch  from standard  to itemized  deductions.  For example,  if 75 percent  of the re- 
turns with standard  deductions  going above $10,000  but not above $15,000  and 90 per- 
cent of those going above $15,000  were given itemized  deductions  of 20 percent  of their 
income, the built-in  flexibility  estimates  for 1995 would be lowered  by 0.008; elasticity 
would be virtually  unaffected. 
25. Despite the continued  increase  in the number  of returns,  the relative  distribution 
of income  reported  on tax returns  has not changed  very  much  in recent  years.  This means 
that the distribution  of the new entries into the taxpaying  population is roughly the 
same as the distribution  of those who leave it because of death, disability, or loss of 
income. Even  if it is assumed  that the extra  0.1 percent  growth  in the number  of returns 
as compared  with the population growth yielded only nontaxable  returns  (an extreme 
assumption),  tax liability in 1995  is overestimated  by only 2.2 percent. 
26. These changes  reduced  tax liabilities  by about 4 percent  in 1972.  See General  Ex- 
planation  of the  Revenue  Act of 1971, H.R. 10947,  92d Congress,  Public  Law  92-178,  Pre- 
pared  by the Staff of the Joint Committee  on Internal  Revenue  Taxation  (1972), pp. 14, 
16. The dummy  variable  for 1970-71 in the taxable  income equation  incorporates  some 
of the effect of the 1972 changes in the personal deductions,  but there is no basis for 
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income  for the period  1954-63.  To make  this test, the tax file was run for 
1954, 1959, and 1963 using known values of adjusted  personal  income, 
capital  gains, exemptions,  and deductions  from Statistics  of Income,  and 
assuming  that the relative  distribution  of income  and of capital  gains  was 
the same  as in 1970  (the  year  of the tax file).  As the following  table  shows, 
the tax file "predicts"  the constant  average  rate of tax (before  credits)  on 
taxable  income  in 1954,  1959,  and 1963  and approximates  the Statistics  of 
Income  figures  for each of the years  remarkably  well. 
Average  effective  individual  income 
tax rates before  credits  (percent) 
From  Statistics 
Year  of Income  From  the taxfile 
1954  23.3  23.3 
1959  23.5  23.0 
1963  23.5  23.2 
Considering  the tremendous  differences  in the methodology  of the two 
approaches,  the 1973  estimates  of taxable  income  and of tax liability  from 
the regression  equations  and  the tax file  were  close.  The  estimate  of taxable 
income  from  the revised  Waldorf  equations  was 1.2  percent  higher  than  the 
estimate  from  the tax file  ($489 billion  vs. $483  billion),  the estimate  of tax 
liability  was 0.7 percent  lower  ($102.7  billion  vs. $103.4  billion),27  and the 
estimate  of the effective  rate of tax was 0.6 percentage  point lower (21.0 
percent  vs. 21.6 percent).  Thus,  the two sets of long-term  simulations  begin 
at approximately  the same  levels for both taxable  income  and tax liabili- 
ties.28 
Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 1 summarize  the results of the long-term 
simulations  for the period 1975-95. Tax liabilities  grow at faster  rates as 
the rate  of income  growth  increases  under  both simulations,  but  the  revised 
27. The projection  of tax liabilities  on the tax file is for tax before  credits.  The credits 
amounted  to $618 million in 1971,  the last year for which such data are available.  (Pre- 
liminary  Report,  Statistics  of Income-1971, Individual  Income  Tax Returns,  p. 21.) The 
estimated  difference  of 0.6 percent  assumes  that the amount of the tax credits  increased 
proportionately  to adjusted  personal  income between  1971 and 1973. 
28. The elasticity  of tax with respect  to adjusted  personal  income under  the Waldorf 
equations  was the same  for 1973  as for 1971,  despite  the fact that elasticity  tends  to decline 
over time if the tax law remains  unchanged  (see Table 2 for the periods 1954-63 and 
1965-69). The elasticity  held up because of the large increase  in capital gains between 
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Table 3.  Federal Individual  Income Tax Liabilities, Built-in Flexibility, 
and Elasticities, Assuming  5 and 8 Percent Annual Rates of Growth of 
Per Capita Adjusted  Personal Income, Based on the Revised Waldorf 
Equations and the 1970 Tax File Simulations, Selected Years, 1975-95 
5 percent  annual  8 percent  annual 
growth  rate  growth  rate 
Revised  Revised 
Waldorf  Tax  file  Waldorf  Tax  file 
Year  equations  simulations"  equations  simulations" 
Tax liabilities  (bilions of dollars) 
1975  121  125  131  136 
1980  181  193  237  263 
1985  268  298  421  500 
1990  393  458  737  937 
1995  574  699  1,273  1,697 
Built-in flexibilityb 
1975  0.167  0.176  0.170  0.183 
1980  0.181  0.200  0.192  0.223 
1985  0.196  0.227  0.214  0.270 
1990  0.210  0.258  0.237  0.317 
1995  0.225  0.289  0.261  0.350 
Elasticitiesc 
1975  1.41  1.54  1.40  1.58 
1980  1.37  1.51  1.35  1.53 
1985  1.34  1.49  1.31  1.50 
1990  1.32  1.48  1.28  1.45 
1995  1.29  1.45  1.25  1.35 
Sources: Projections for the revised  Waldorf equations are based on equations (3) and (6) of the appendix. 
a.  The tax file estimates assume no change in the relative distribution of income as income grows. 
b.  Built-in  flexibility  is the ratio of the absolute increase  (decrease)  in tax liabilities to the absolute increase 
(decrease) in adjusted personal income. 
c.  Elasticity is the ratio of the percentage change in tax liabilities to the percentage  change in adjusted 
personal income. 
Waldorf  equations  do not capture  the full effect  of the progressivity  of the 
income  tax and, therefore,  greatly  understate  its responsiveness  to income 
growth.  For example,  assuming  a 5 percent  growth  in adjusted  personal  in- 
come per capita,  the tax liabilities  estimated  from  the tax file exceed  those 
estimated  from  the equations  by 3 percent  in 1975,  11 percent  in 1985,  and 
22 percent  in 1995. The built-in  flexibility  and elasticity  measures  reflect 
these  differences.  By 1995,  the tax file estimate  of the built-in  flexibility  of 
the income  tax is 0.289  as compared  with  only  0.225  for the estimates  from 
the equations.  Similarly,  the tax file estimate  of the elasticity  of the income Joseph A. Pechman  399 
Table 4.  Projections of Built-in Flexibility and Elasticities of the Federal 
Individual  Income Tax at Selected Annual Rates of Growth of Per Capita 
Adjusted  Personal Income, Based on Simulations  from the 1970 Tax File, 
Selected Years, 1975_95a 
Annual growth rates in income per capita 
Year  4 percent  5 percent  6 percent  8 percent  10 percent 
Built-in flexibilityb 
1975  0.173  0.176  0.179  0.183  0.187 
1980  0.192  0.200  0.207  0.223  0.238 
1985  0.212  0.227  0.242  0.270  0.298 
1990  0.236  0.258  0.279  0.317  0.344 
1995  0.262  0.289  0.314  0.350  0.370 
Elasticityc 
1975  1.52  1.54  1.56  1.58  1.59 
1980  1.49  1.51  1.52  1.53  1.54 
1985  1.48  1.49  1.50  1.50  1.49 
1990  1.47  1.48  1.48  1.45  1.38 
1995  1.46  1.45  1.43  1.35  1.26 
a.  The estimates assume no change in the relative distribution of income as income grows. 
b. Built-in flexibility  is the ratio of the absolute increase  (decrease)  in tax liabilities to the absolute increase 
(decrease) in adjusted personal income. 
c.  Elasticity is the ratio of the percentage change in tax liabilities to the percentage change in adjusted 
personal income. 
tax  in 1995  is 1.45,  while  the equations  yield  an estimate  of only 1.29  (Table 
3). At an 8 percent  growth  rate,  the differences  are  considerably  larger  for 
the built-in  flexibility  measure. 
These  comparisons  do not by themselves  prove  that  the estimates  based 
on the tax file are more accurate  than those obtained  from the Waldorf 
equations.  One  clue is given  by the separate  estimates  of the built-in  flexi- 
bility of the tax base and of the average  effective  rates  under  the two ap- 
proaches.  Throughout  the period,  the estimates  of the built-in  flexibility  of 
the tax base obtained  from the Waldorf  equations  are somewhat  higher 
than the estimates  from the tax file. Consequently,  somewhat  more than 
the entire  difference  in tax liabilities  is explained  by the lower  effective  rate 
on taxable  income obtained  from the Waldorf  equations.29  Since  the tax 
file does not overestimate  the growth  in the tax base, it is fair to assume 
that its forecasts  of the distribution  of the tax base  by rate  brackets  (which 
29. For example,  for the year 1980, assuming  a 5 percent  annual growth rate, the 
built-in  flexibility  of the tax base  is 0.698  from the Waldorf  equations  and 0.691 from the 
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Figure  1. Average  Effective  Federal  Individual  Income  Tax Rates  and 
Annual  Rate of Growth  of Tax Liabilities,  at Selected  Annual 
Rates  of Growth  in Per Capita  Adjusted  Personal  Income,  Based  on 
Simulations  from the 1970 Tax File, 1975_95a 
Percent 
Average  effective  rate 
10 % growthl  of per ccapita  inlcome 
30- 
20  - 
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,  / 
0 
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a.  The estimates assume no change in the relative distribution of income as income grows. Simulations 
begin in the first quarter  of 1974. See text for the other assumptions used in preparing the estimates. Joseph  A. Pechman  401 
determines  the average  effective  tax rate on taxable income) are fairly 
accurate.30 
On  the assumption  that  the tax file  estimates  are  more  nearly  correct,  the 
following  observations  may be made about the responsiveness  of the in- 
come tax under  present  law to changes  in income  in the years  ahead: 
1. The  built-in  flexibility  of the income  tax has increased  significantly  in 
recent  years.  In 1968,  a year  in which  per  capita  adjusted  personal  income 
rose 8 percent,  built-in  flexibility  was 0.157  (Table  2). Though  exemptions 
and  deductions  have  been  liberalized  in recent  years,  on the assumption  of 
an 8 percent  annual  income  growth  rate,  built-in  flexibility  would  be 0.183 
in 1975,  0.270 in 1985,  and 0.350 in 1995  (Table  3). To put it in another 
way,  the annual  fiscal  dividend  or fiscal  drag  from  the income  tax would  be 
almost  twice  as much  in 1995  as in 1975.  The explanation  of this develop- 
ment is that, with the continuous  upward  shift of incomes  in the taxable 
income  scale,  the effect  of rate graduation  becomes  more and more pro- 
nounced  (see Figure  1). With  continued  increases  in income,  built-in  flexi- 
bility  would  ultimately  approach  a weighted  average  of the top rates  apply- 
ing to various  types of income,  or about  50 percent.3' 
2. Assuming  continuous  growth  of income  per  capita,  individual  income 
tax  revenues  will  grow  at an almost  constant  rate  for a long time  (Figure  1). 
For example,  at a 5 percent  growth  rate, the annual  revenue  growth  de- 
clines  from  9.3 percent  in 1975  only  to 8.8  percent  in 1995.  At higher  growth 
rates,  which  imply  substantial  rates  of inflation,  the decline  in the rate is 
more  noticeable,  but revenue  growth  remains  very  large  even  at the end of 
twenty  years.  Thus, at an 8 percent  annual  growth  rate, annual  revenue 
growth  is 14.3  percent  in 1975  and it is still 12.3  percent  in 1995.  In dollar 
terms,  the annual  revenue  growth  increases  from $11  billion  in 1975  to $56 
billion  at a 5 percent  growth  rate  and  from $17  billion  to $185  billion  at an 
8 percent  growth  rate. 
3. The built-in  stabilizing  properties  of the income tax are directly  re- 
lated  to the growth  rate.  In 1975,  the increase  in tax revenue  would  cut  into 
the increase  in adjusted  personal  income  by 17.3  percent  at a growth  rate 
of 4 percent,  17.9  percent  at 6 percent,  18.3  percent  at 8 percent,  and 18.7 
percent  at 10 percent.  If present  law remains  in effect,  in 1995  the individ- 
30. Assuming,  of course,  that the relative  distribution  of income remains  unchanged. 
31. This is an average,  with 1971 weights, of the 50 percent top rate on earned  in- 
comes, 35 percent  top rate on capital gains, 10 percent  rate on preference  incomes, and 
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ual income  tax will siphon off 26.2 percent  of the increase  in income  at a 
growth  rate of 4 percent,  31.4 percent  at 6 percent,  35.0 percent  at 8 per- 
cent, and 37.0 percent  at 10 percent  (Table  4). 
4. In 1975,  the elasticity  of the individual  income  tax will  vary  from  1.52 
to 1.59  for annual  growth  rates  in per  capita  income  between  4 percent  and 
10 percent.  Thereafter,  the elasticity  declines  moderately  for the lower 
growth  rates  and sharply  for the higher  growth  rates  (Table  4). This pat- 
tern reflects  the fact that the largest  percentage increase  in taxes occurs 
when  individual  incomes  increase  from a low level.32 
Projected  Liabilities  under  Conditions  of Instability 
To illustrate  the built-in  flexibility  of the individual  income tax under 
conditions  of instability,  three sets of simulations  were prepared  on the 
basis  of the 1970  tax  file.  These  simulations  trace  the  behavior  of the  income 
tax (1) during  business  cycles of varying  lengths  and severity;  (2) during 
periods  of inflation  in which  the relative  distribution  of adjusted  personal 
income  remains  the same or changes  radically;  and (3) during  periods  in 
which the stock market  produces  sharp  fluctuations  in reported  capital 
gains. The simulations  are on a quarterly  basis and begin with the first 
quarter  of 1974, on the assumption  that per capita adjusted  personal  in- 
come in that quarter  is running  at an annual  rate  that is 5 percent  higher 
than  the average  for calendar  year 1973.  All the other  assumptions  used  in 
the long-term  simulations  were carried  over into the short-term  simula- 
tions; any modifications  served  only to adapt  them  to a quarterly  basis.33 
CYCLICAL  CONDITIONS 
The business  cycle simulations  assume  contractions  of two and four 
quarters  and uniform  rates  of decline  in per capita adjusted  personal  in- 
32. For example,  when adjusted  gross income increases  10 percent  the tax of a mar- 
ried couple with two children  increases  73 percent  at $5,000 and 17 percent  at $50,000. 
The calculation  assumes  personal  deductions  of 15 percent  of adjusted  gross income or 
the low-income  allowance,  whichever  is higher. 
33. Thus,  it was assumed  that population  continues  to grow by 1 percent  a year and 
the number  of income tax returns  by 1.1 percent  a year; that the elasticity of itemized 
deductions  with respect to income is 1.05; and that one out of every four taxpayers 
switches  from the standard  deduction  to itemized deductions  when incomes rise above 
$10,000.  When  incomes decline,  returns  with itemized  deductions  are switched  to stan- 
dard  deduction  if the standard  deduction  exceeds  the itemized  deductions  calculated  on 
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come  and  its components  of 0.5 percent,  1 percent,  and 2 percent  per  quar- 
ter.  To complete  the cycles,  the expansions  were  allowed  to run  three  times 
as long as the contractions  and rates  of growth  in per  capita  incomes  were 
selected  to return  to long-term  trend  values  underlying  the 5 percent  growth 
rate  calculations  in Figure  1. This  required  rates  of income  growth  of 1,81 
percent,  1.98 percent,  and 2.33 percent,  respectively,  for the three  cycles. 
While no business  cycle has ever exhibited  these relatively  simple char- 
acteristics,  actual  experience  in the United States  since the end of World 
War  II has been well within  the assumed  patterns.34 
The  results  of these  simulations  for the  income  tax  laws  applying  to 1954, 
1965,  and 1973  are  shown  in Table  5. The first  set of calculations  shown  in 
the table  comprises  the horizontal  built-in  flexibility  and elasticities,  which 
are  calculated  on the  basis  of incomes  and  tax  liabilities  at the  previous  peak 
or trough.  These  compare  the reduction  in tax liabilities  between  the peak 
and the trough  of the cycle with the loss of income during  the period of 
contraction.  The second comprises  the vertical  built-in flexibility and 
elasticities,  which  are calculated  on the basis of income  and tax liabilities 
at the long-term  growth  trend  values  in the trough  quarter  of the contrac- 
tion. These  compare  the shortfall  in tax liabilities  below their  trend  value 
at the trough  of the cycle with the shortfall  of income  below trend  at the 
trough. 
The horizontal  measures  of the income sensitivity  of the income  tax,in 
cyclical  conditions  greatly  exceed  the corresponding  measures  in the long- 
term  simulations,  while  the vertical  measures  are  roughly  of the same  mag- 
nitude.  For example,  under  the law that is now in effect,  the horizontal 
built-in  flexibility  of the income tax in the mildest  recessions  shown in 
Table  5 (contractions  at a rate  of decline  of 0.5 percent  per  quarter)  is in the 
neighborhood  of 0.24 compared  with 0.17 or 0.18 for 1975  under  condi- 
tions of sustained  growth  (see Table  4). Similarly,  the horizontal  elasticity 
in such  a contraction  is about  2.1 as compared  with  a long-term  estimate  of 
1.5 for the year 1975.  The greater  horizontal  sensitivity  of the income  tax 
during  periods  of contraction  reflects  mainly  the continued  increase  in the 
number  of exemptions  as incomes decline. In addition,  the low-income 
allowance  in effect  places  a floor under  the personal  deductions,  even if it 
is assumed  that itemized  deductions  have an elasticity  with respect  to in- 
34. The longest  contraction  was for a period  of four  quarters,  with  declines  in personal 
income per capita of less than 0.5 percent.  Thus, the longest and severest  contractions 
in these simulations  would be regarded  as a serious depression. | 
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come  that  is greater  than one. On the other  hand,  there  is very  little  differ- 
ence  between  the vertical  and  long-term  measures,  because  the comparison 
is being  made  for the same  quarter  so that the number  of exemptions  are 
the same  in both cases.  Thus,  the vertical  built-in  flexibility  under  present 
law is about  0.18 for the mildest  recession  shown  in Table  5, as compared 
with trend  values  of between  0.17 and 0.18 for 1975 (Table  4). In other 
words,  so long as population  increases,  the exemption  feature  will augment 
the stabilizing  effectiveness  of the income  tax during  a recession,  but will 
dampen  it over the longer  run. 
Another  conclusion  to be drawn  from  Table  5 is that changes  in the tax 
law since 1954  have  reduced  the built-in  flexibility,  but increased  the elas- 
ticity, of the income  tax with respect  to adjusted  personal  income  during 
cyclical  movements.  The decline  in built-in  flexibility  is due to the reduc- 
tions in tax rates  made  in 1964  and the liberalizations  of the exemptions 
and deductions  under  the 1969  and 1971  tax acts. Elasticity  has increased 
because  the splitting  of the first  $2,000  bracket  into four $500  brackets,  to- 
gether  with  the higher  exemptions  and personal  deductions,  has enhanced 
progression. 
INFLATIONARY  CONDITIONS 
Since  the income  tax applies  to money  income,  its response  to increases 
in money  income  during  periods  of inflation  will differ  from  the responses 
already  measured  with the use of the tax file (see Figure  1) insofar  as the 
inflation  alters  the distribution  of income  by source  and by size. To illus- 
trate  such effects,  a series  of quarterly  simulations  were  made on the tax 
file, again  beginning  in the first  quarter  of 1974,  assuming  increases  in per 
capita  adjusted  personal  income of 2, 3, and 4 percent  per quarter  for a 
period of two years. Income tax liabilities  were first computed  on the 
assumption  that all incomes  rise  by the same  percentage,  thus keeping  the 
relative  distribution  unchanged.  To simulate  a "profit  inflation,"  per  capita 
property  and  entrepreneurial  incomes  were  raised  by twice  the average  rate 
-that  is, at 4, 6, and 8 percent  per quarter-and wages  and salaries  were 
allowed  to rise  just enough  to keep  the weighted  average  increase  in total 
income  per capita at 2, 3, and 4 percent  per quarter.35  This required  in- 
35. The calculations  were based on the 1971 distribution  of adjusted  personal in- 
come between wages and salaries (including  social security taxes) and other income. 
Capital  gains,  which  are not included  in adjusted  personal  income, were assumed  to in- 
crease  at the same rate as other  income. The effect of differential  capital gains changes 
is examined  separately  later. 406  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
creases  in per  capita  wage  and  salary  income  of 1.34,  2.02,  and  2.69  percent 
per  quarter.  To simulate  a "wage  inflation,"  the assumptions  were  reversed. 
Per capita  wages  and salaries  were  increased  by 10 percent  more  than the 
average  rate-that is, by 2.2, 3.3, and 4.4 percent  per quarter-while per 
capita  property  incomes  were  allowed  to increase  by only 1.39,  2.09, and 
2.78 percent  per quarter  so that the increase  in total income per capita 
would  again  average  2, 3, and  4 percent  per  quarter.  The  changes  in the dis- 
tribution  of income  implied  by the simulation  of the profit  inflation  are 
much  larger  than any two-year  changes  experienced  in the United States 
since 1947,  while  the changes  implied  by the simulation  of the wage  infla- 
tion are  similar  in magnitude  to the two-year  changes  actually  observed  in 
the same  period.36 
Because  wages  and salaries  are roughly  three-quarters  of adjusted  per- 
sonal  income,  the built-in  flexibility  and  the elasticity  of the income  tax are 
virtually  the same in an inflation  in which all incomes increase  propor- 
tionately  and in a wage  inflation  (Table  6). During  a profit  inflation  of the 
magnitudes  simulated  in this series  of calculations,  the two measures  are 
raised  significantly.  For example,  after  a year  with 3 percent  inflation  per 
quarter,  built-in  flexibility  is 0.186 if all incomes  increase  proportionately, 
but it increases  to 0.200 if property  and entrepreneurial  incomes  rise by 
twice the average  rate.  The corresponding  figures  for the elasticity  of the 
income tax in these conditions  are 1.62 and 1.73, respectively.  But such 
changes  are highly  unlikely  because  the assumptions  are unrealistic.  For 
the range  of recent  experience  in the United States,  the built-in  flexibility 
and elasticity  of the income  tax would  be virtually  unaffected  by changes 
in the  distribution  of incomes  that  are  included  in adjusted  personal  income. 
THE  EFFECT  OF  CAPITAL  GAINS 
Between  1966 and 1971, year-to-year  changes  in the net capital  gains 
reported  on tax  returns  were  +33 percent,  +29 percent,  -15  percent,  -28 
36. For example,  after two years of increases  in average  money income of 3 percent 
per capita per quarter,  wages and salaries  decline from 75.3 percent  to 70.5 percent  of 
adjusted  personal  income in the profit  inflation  and rise to 77.1 percent  of adjusted  per- 
sonal  income  in the wage  inflation.  Since 1947,  wage  and salary  income  as a percentage  of 
adjusted  personal  income has changed  by less than 1 percent  in twenty-one  years; and 
in only three years was the change between 1 and 1.5 percent.  Economic  Report  of the 
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percent,  and +36 percent.37  These  fluctuations  reflect  the gyrations  of the 
stock  market,  which  if anything  has moved  inversely  to the rate  of change 
in the  general  price  level  in recent  years.  To evaluate  the effect  of such  large 
changes  in capital gains on income tax revenues,  the simulations  that 
assume  2, 3, and 4 percent  quarterly  rates  of growth  in per  capita  income 
were  modified  to allow for quarterly  increases  and decreases  of 8 percent 
per  capita  in capital  gains  alone.  All other  income  increases  were  kept  the 
same.  At a quarterly  rate of 8 percent,  per capita  capital  gains  would  rise 
by 36 percent  or fall by 28 percent  per  year,  percentages  that are  not very 
different  from the year-to-year  changes  in four of the five years  between 
1966  and 1971. 
The  results  of the capital  gains  simulations  are  also shown  in Table  6. In 
all cases,  the influence  of capital  gains  on the income  sensitivity  of the in- 
come tax is large,  at least  as compared  to the effects  of the wage  and profit 
inflations.  For example,  with  quarterly  growth  of 2 percent  per  capita  in all 
other kinds of income, a quarterly  rise in capital  gains of 8 percent  per 
capita  would  increase  the built-in  flexibility  of the income  tax with  respect 
to adjusted  personal  income  from  0.182  to 0.200  in the first  year  and from 
0.189  to 0.216  in the second  year;  a quarterly  reduction  of 8 percent  would 
reduce  built-in  flexibility  to 0.155  in the first  year  and 0.169  in the second. 
The changes  in elasticity  are of similar  proportions.  Thus, capital gains 
have a major  influence  on the cyclical  sensitivity  of the income tax and 
could have a perverse  effect  if stock market  prices  continued  to move in- 
versely  to the general  price  level. 
REAL  TRANSFERS  TO  THE  GOVERNMENT  DURING  INFLATION 
The exercise  summarized  in Table 6 also permits  a calculation  of the 
automatic  transfer  of real  resources  from  the taxpayers  to the government 
during  an inflation  via the individual  income  tax. To make  this calculation, 
it was assumed  that per capita adjusted  personal income and capital 
gains  would  grow  at 4 percent  a year  in a noninflationary  situation.38  Tax 
37. These figures  refer to the portion of net capital gains included  in adjusted  gross 
income. See Statistics  of Income-1970, Individual  Income  Tax  Returns,  Table 82, p. 310, 
and Preliminary  Report, Statistics of Income-1971,  Individual  Income Tax Returns, 
Table 3, p. 16. 
38. This is the sum of 3 percent  annual  growth  in per capita productivity  and a min- 
imum allowance  of 1 percent  for the gradual  increase  in the general  price level that oc- 
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Table 7.  Resource Transfer  from Individual  Income Taxpayers to the 
Federal Government  after Eight Quarters  of Inflation,  Based on Simulations 
from the 1970 Tax Filea 
Resources  transferredb 
Per capita  Percent  of 
income  growth  disposable  Percent  of 
(percent  per year)  income  tax liability 
4 (noninflationary)  0.0  0.0 
8.2a  0.7  4.9 
12.6d  1.4  8.8 
17.0  2.1  12.9 
a.  The estimates assume that all incomes on the tax file increase by the percentages shown in the first 
column. Simulations begin in the first quarter of 1974. 
b.  Amount of tax attributable to the application of the progressive rates to the portion of income that is 
due to inflation. 
c.  2 percent per quarter. 
d.  3 percent per quarter. 
e.  4 percent per quarter. 
liabilities  and  disposable  incomes  at the end  of such  a two-year  period  were 
calculated  using  the built-in  flexibility  estimates  derived  from  the  tax file  for 
the year 1975  (see Table  4). The aggregate  disposable  income  after  a two- 
year  period  of quarterly  increases  in per  capita  income  of 2, 3, and  4 percent 
(that  is, annual  income  increases  of 8.2, 12.6,  and 17.0  percent,  respectively) 
were  then compared  with the amount  of income  that would  be needed  to 
maintain  the real purchasing  power  of the disposable  income  in the non- 
inflationary  situation.  The  difference  between  the two represents  the  loss of 
income  to taxpayers  resulting  from  the presence  of the progressive  income 
tax, expressed  at the inflated  prices. 
The transfer  of resources  defined  in this way is not impressive  (Table  7). 
For example,  per  capita  income  increases  of 17  percent  a year  imply  annual 
rates  of inflation  of 14  percent.39  Individual  income  tax  liabilities  at the end 
of two years  of such an inflation  are 12.9 percent  higher  than they would 
have  been  in the noninflationary  situation,  while  disposable  income  is only 
2.1 percent  lower.40  If the exemptions  and  the  tax brackets  were  adjusted  to 
eliminate  this real tax increase,  the revenue  lost could be recovered  by 
39. On the assumption  that productivity  growth  accounts  for 3 percent,  the remain- 
ing 14 percent  is due to inflation. 
40. The degree  of variation  around  this average  is not very  large.  For a married  cou- 
ple with two children,  the real transfer  rises  from  about 2.5 percent  of disposable  income 
at the $5,000  to $10,000  level to a maximum  of about 5.7 percent  in the highest  income 
level. 410  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
Table 8.  Comparison  of Tax Liabilities after a Two-Year Inflation of 14 
Percent a Year, under  Present Law and Two Methods of Correcting  for 
Inflation, Married Couples with Two Children,  Selected Incomes 
Percentage  change  from 
tax liabilities  under 
Tax liabilitiess  (dollars)  present  law 
Income  -- 
(dollars)  Present  lawb  Method  AO  Method  Bd  Method  A? Method  Bd 
5,000  98  0  0  -100.0  -100.0 
10,000  905  724  865  -20.0  -4.4 
15,000  1,765  1,524  1,793  -13.6  +1.6 
20,000  2,760  2,424  2,821  -12.2  +2.2 
25,000  3,890  3,428  3,951  -11.9  +1.6 
50,000  11,915  10,263  11,423  -13.9  -4.1 
100,000  34,500  31,026  33,462  -10.1  -3.0 
a.  Tax liabilities computed on the assumption that taxpayer  uses the low-income allowance of $1,300 or 
15 percent of income, whichever is higher. 
b. Present law refers to the rates and exemptions applying to the year 1973. 
c.  Method A would increase the exemptions and the bracket limits by the percentage of inflation. 
d. Method B would increase the exemptions and the bracket limits by the percentage of inflation and 
would raise the marginal tax rates by 3 percentage points. 
increasing  the tax rates by an average  of 3.1 percentage  points in each 
bracket.  The reduction  in real  income and the necessary  rate adjustments 
would  be even smaller  for the more  moderate  inflations. 
The  kind  of adjustments  in tax liabilities  implied  under  a tax system  that 
corrected  for an inflation  of 14 percent  a year  over  a period  of two years  is 
illustrated  in Table 8 for a family of four with selected  incomes  ranging 
from $5,000  to $100,000.  In this table,  the tax liabilities  under  present  law 
are  compared  with  those  resulting  from  the application  of two methods  of 
correcting  for inflation.  Method  A would  increase  the exemptions  and the 
bracket  limits  by the  percentage  of inflation.  This  would  completely  remove 
the loss of income  by taxpayers  resulting  from  the application  of the pro- 
gressive  income tax to the inflated  incomes.41  Method B is the same as 
method  A, except  that  the marginal  tax rates  are  increased  by 3 percentage 
points across  the board.  The increase  in rates is designed  to recover  the 
revenue  lost as a result of the correction  for inflation.  Thus, method B 
raises  the same amount  of revenue  as the present  law, but distributes  the 
41. Canada  is considering  the adoption of such a system effective  with incomes re- 
ceived in 1974. See John Bossons and Thomas A. Wilson, "Adjusting  Tax Rates for 
Inflation,"  Canadian  Tax Journal,  Vol. 21 (May-June 1973),  pp. 185-99. Joseph A. Pechman  411 
inflation  penalty  approximately  in proportion  to the  taxable  incomes  before 
the inflation. 
If method  A were  used, the tax would  be reduced  by 100  percent  at the 
$5,000  income  level,  by 20 percent  at $10,000,  and  by 10 to 14 percent  be- 
tween  $15,000  and $100,000.  Method  B would  also reduce  the tax by 100 
percent  at $5,000,  but  at higher  levels  the  new  tax  would  be very  close  to the 
tax under  present  law, with  a range  of +4 percent  to -2  percent.  In other 
words,  if the revenue  raised  as a result  of the built-in  flexibility  of the in- 
dividual  income  tax during  an inflation  were  distributed  in accordance  with 
taxable  incomes  corrected  for the inflation  (roughly  method  B), the major 
beneficiaries  would  be the taxpayers  with the lowest  incomes.  The tax lia- 
bilities  of taxpayers  with  higher  incomes  would  not be altered  significantly. 
Since the inflation  assumed  for purposes  of the illustrations  in Table 8 
greatly  exceeds  the inflations  experienced  in the United  States,  the only ad- 
justment  that  seems  to be needed  is a periodic  adjustment  of the exemptions 
(without  changing  the rate brackets)  in order  to eliminate  the inflation 
penalty  for those who are at or near  the minimum  taxable  levels. 
Summary  and  Implications 
Despite  frequent  changes  in the tax law, annual  individual  income tax 
liabilities  during  the last twenty-five  years can be estimated  within rela- 
tively  small  margins  of error  on the basis of two simple  regressions.  The 
first  relates  taxable  income  to personal  income  per capita  and exemptions 
per capita,  and the second  calculates  tax liabilities  by multiplying  taxable 
income  by a rate  variable  representing  the average  tax rate on taxable  in- 
come. Beginning  in 1964,  an additional  taxable  income  variable  is needed 
in the  tax  liability  equation  to track  the  rise  in the average  effective  tax  rate, 
which  undoubtedly  has been a response  to the movement  of taxable  in- 
comes  upward  in the rate  brackets  as per capita  income  has increased.  In 
1971,  the last year  for which  the official  Statistics  of Income  are available, 
the built-in  flexibility  measure  derived  from these equations  suggests  that 
the individual  income  tax increased  by about $1.6 billion when adjusted 
personal  income  increased  by $10 billion, and the elasticity  measure  sug- 
gests that individual  income  tax revenues  rose about 14 percent  when  ad- 
justed  personal  income  rose 10 percent. 
The  regression  analysis  explains  past  movements  in income  tax  liabilities 412  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
remarkably  well. However,  it gives lower estimates  than do the tax file 
simulations  for both the built-in  flexibility  and the elasticity  of the income 
tax under  conditions  of sustained  growth,  during  the contraction  phase  of 
a business  cycle, and during  periods  of inflation.  The reason is that the 
variable  that was intended  to take the effect  of progression  into account 
measures  only  the effect  of what  happened  in the past;  it cannot  predict  the 
effects  of progression  after  the absolute  distribution  of income  has shifted 
substantially  upward.  The  prediction  errors  become  larger,  of course,  as the 
period  of projection  is lengthened.  Thus,  the income  tax equation  in econo- 
metric  models,  which  is usually  based on recent  experience  and modified 
only for statutory  changes,  gives satisfactory  results  for brief periods  in 
which incomes  continue  to grow moderately,  and becomes  increasingly 
inadequate  as the forecast  horizon  is extended  or if income  growth  changes 
abruptly  in response  to either a business  contraction  or an inflationary 
shock. In such circumstances,  projections  on the basis of the tax file will 
give better  results. 
The federal  individual  income tax continues  to be an effective  built-in 
stabilizer  to the extent  that the economic  behavior  of individuals  depends 
on their disposable  income computed  on an after-tax  liability  basis. Al- 
though  tax rates  have been reduced  and exemptions  and personal  deduc- 
tions have been liberalized,  the built-in flexibility  and elasticity  of the 
income tax are already  higher  now than they were  during  the 1950s  and 
early  1960s.  With  present  rates  and  exemptions,  assuming  per  capita  income 
growth  of 5 or 6 percent  a year, individual  income tax revenues  would 
increase  by about $1.8 billion for every $10 billion increase  in adjusted 
personal  income  in 1975  and by about $2.0 billion  in 1980.  In the type of 
brief  and  mild contractions  experienced  in the United  States  since  the end 
of World  War  II, the automatic  responsiveness  of the income  tax would  be 
even  higher  because  exemptions  continue  to increase  when  incomes  decline 
and thus reinforce  the effect  of progression.42 
42. These conclusions  apply to the individual  income tax only on a liability basis. 
The national accounts data, which are the basis for most of the econometric  work on 
the stability  of the economy, are on a payments  basis. Since legislative  changes  in with- 
holding rates may cause large changes  in year-end  settlements,  seasonally  adjusted  in- 
dividual  income tax payments  are frequently  discontinuous  in the first  quarters  of years 
in which refunds  increase  or decrease  sharply.  For example,  individual  income tax re- 
funds rose from about $14 billion in early 1972  to about $22 billion in early 1973. As a 
result,  federal  individual  tax payments,  as measured  in the national accounts,  fell at an 
annual  rate of $2.8 billion in the first  quarter  of 1973, a quarter  in which adjusted  per- 
sonal income  rose by $25.1 billion. On a liability  basis, the individual  income  tax proba- Joseph  A. Pechman  413 
The  responsiveness  of the  income  tax  to changes  in money  incomes  other 
than  capital  gains  is roughly  the same  whether  the changes  reflect  increases 
in real income  solely or include  substantial  price effects  as well. Experi- 
ments  with  the tax file suggest  that changes  in the distribution  of adjusted 
personal  income  (which  does not include  capital  gains)  of the type experi- 
enced  during  the past  twenty-five  years  have  virtually  no effect  on built-in 
flexibility  or elasticity. 
The  only  circumstance  in which  changes  in the distribution  of income  do 
have  a significant  effect  is when  capital  gains  rise  or fall sharply  relative  to 
other  incomes.  Recent  fluctuations  in reported  capital  gains  have  been  very 
large.  Since  they  are  heavily  concentrated  in the top income  classes,  capital 
gains  have  major  revenue  consequences  even though  they are subject  to a 
top rate of 36.5 percent.  Furthermore,  if stock market  movements  are 
erratic  or if they  do not correspond  closely  with  movements  in general  busi- 
ness activity,  capital  gains  can have a perverse  effect  on the built-in  flexi- 
bility of the income  tax. 
During periods  of inflation,  there is an automatic  transfer  of real re- 
sources  from  the taxpayer  to the  government  as a result  of the  progressivity 
of the income  tax. Surprisingly,  the transfer  is not very  large  in the aggre- 
gate-and does not vary greatly  by income  classes-even for much  more 
severe  inflations  than  those  experienced  in the  United  States  in recent  years. 
Periodic  adjustments  to keep exemptions  in line with increases  in living 
costs should  be sufficient  to eliminate  the most burdensome  feature  of the 
income  tax during  periods  of rising  prices. 
bly rose at an annual rate of about $4 billion during  this quarter.  This estimate  was 
obtained  by multiplying  the $25.1 billion  increase  in adjusted  personal  income  by a built- 
in flexibility  estimate derived  from the tax file of 0.17. Whether  the payments or the 
liability  basis  is more  appropriate  for economic  analysis  is debatable,  but the differences 
clearly  are not inconsequential. 414  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
APPENDIX 
Derivations  of Estimating  Equations 
Based on Time Series 
ROBERT  E.  LITAN 
THIS  APPENDIX  brings  up to date and revises  the time series  estimates  of 
taxable  income  (Z) and tax liabilities  (T) originally  presented  in an article 
by William  H. Waldorf.'  The revisions  are necessary  to incorporate  the 
effects  of the Revenue  Acts of 1964, 1969,  and 1971  and of changes  in the 
distribution  of income  in the specification  of two of his equations.  The  data 
used  in preparing  the revised  specifications  are given  in Table  A-1. 
In his initial  equation,  Waldorf  used the following  form, developed  by 
Brown  and Kruizenga,  to estimate  Z:2 
(1)  = ao  al-a3D58-65, 
where Y is personal  income,  N is total population,  E is personal  exemp- 
tions, D is a dummy  variable,  and a represents  the respective  coefficients. 
Thus,  this equation  relates  the percentage  of nontaxable  personal  income 
(1 -  Z/  Y)  to per capita personal  income (Y/N), per capita exemptions 
(E/N), and a dummy  variable  for 1958-65  (D58-65). Per capita  income  is 
included  as an independent  variable  because  rising  per  capita  incomes  tend 
to raise  the percentage  of income that is subject  to tax. Increases  in per 
capita  exemptions  have the opposite  effect.  The 1958-65  dummy  variable 
was used  to pick up what  appeared  to be a significant  shift  in the relation- 
ship between  taxable  and personal  income during  that period,  although 
Waldorf  acknowledged  that the dummy  improved  the fit of the equation 
only modestly. 
1. "Responsiveness  of Federal  Personal  Income  Taxes,"  pp. 37-44. 
2. See "Income Sensitivity  of a Personal Income Tax" for a detailed discussion of 
the formulation  of this equation. Joseph A. Pechman  415 
The version  of equation  (1) in logarithmic  form for the 1947-65  period 
iS3 
log (I  -  -0.1962  -  0.3360 log (-)  +  0.3397 log (N)  y  ~~~(24.0)  ~N)  (11.4) 
(2)  +  0.0189D58-65. 
(3.6) 
=  0.987;  standard error of estimate  =  0.0064; 
Durbin-Watson  statistic =  2.37. 
Waldorf  tried  per  capita  personal  deductions  and capital  gains  as explana- 
tory variables,  but met with little success.  He also found  that a better  sta- 
tistical  fit was obtained  when adjusted  gross income was substituted  for 
personal  income  in (2)-a  not unexpected  result  because  most of the items 
that are subtracted  from or added  back to personal  income to arrive  at 
adjusted  gross  income are either  exogenous  or are not directly  related  to 
personal  income. 
Several  experiments  were  conducted  in the  process  of updating  this  equa- 
tion to cover  the  years  through  1971.  Again,  personal  deductions  per  capita 
did not perform  well as an independent  variable,  and the substitution  of 
adjusted  gross  income  for personal  income  yielded  better  results.  However, 
three  other  changes  also improved  on Waldorf's  specifications. 
First,  the dummy  variable  Waldorf  used  to account  for the break  in the 
relationship  between  taxable  and personal  income  beginning  in 1958  can 
be eliminated  if the personal  income variable  is properly  adjusted.  Spe- 
cifically,  the 1958  break  appears  to be due mainly  to the large  boost in 
transfer  payments  in that  year.  If transfer  payments  (P) are  subtracted  and 
the associated  increases  in personal  contributions  for social  insurance  (S) 
are  added  to personal  income,  an adjusted  personal  income  series  (YYa)  sub- 
stantially  free of two major exogenous  components  can be constructed. 
This adjusted  series,  which  was used  to replace  Y in (1), can be explained 
without  a dummy  variable  for 1958-65;  it is also  more  useful  for prediction 
and simulation  purposes  (since Ya  can be projected  more easily  than Y, 
and P and S must usually  be estimated  separately  in any case). 
Second,  one major  revision  was  made  on the right-hand  side  of the equa- 
tion. Contrary  to the evidence  presented  by Waldorf  for 1947-65,  capital 
3. Some of the coefficients  in (2) differ  from those originally  presented  in Waldorf's 
article  (p. 38) because  he estimated  the equation  with logarithms  to the base 10 whereas 
logarithms  to the base e are used here. The numbers  in parentheses  here and in subse- 
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gains  per capita  (C/N) were  found  to exert  a significant  positive  effect  on 
the fraction  of taxable  personal  income over the expanded  time period. 
Since  capital  gains  have shown  much  more  volatility  since 1965  than  they 
did before,  they must  be included  as an independent  variable  in the equa- 
tion. Otherwise,  the elasticity  of taxable  income with respect  to adjusted 
personal  income  would  be overstated. 
Third,  a dummy  is needed  for the 1970-71  years  (D70-71) because  of the 
sharp  increase  in the minimum  standard  deduction  and  the introduction  of 
the low-income  allowance  by the Tax Reform  Act of 1969.  As an alterna- 
tive to the dummy  variable  approach,  a per  capita  estimate  of the effect  of 
the new provisions  was included  in the exemptions  series,  but this did not 
improve  the statistical  performance  of the equation. 
When  estimated  in logarithmic  form  over  the 1947-71  years,  the revised 
taxable  income  equation  becomes 
log (I  -  z  =  -0.7129  -  0.2968 log (Ya)  +  0.3816 log (N)  \  Ya/  (16.4)  \/  (11.3) 
(3)  -0.0289  log (-)  +  0.0252D70-71. 
(3.4)  N  (3.0) 
2=  0.994; standard  error  of estimate = 0.0079; 
Durbin-Watson  statistic = 1.73. 
Predicted  values  of taxable  income and residuals  from equation  (3) are 
presented  in Table  A-2. Although,  in general,  the statistical  properties  of 
the equation  are  satisfactory,  the serial  correlation  in the residuals  tends  to 
become  more  pronounced  when  the predicted  values  are  converted  to dol- 
lar amounts,  as shown  in the table,  from  the ratio  form  in which  they are 
fitted.  The equation  overpredicts  taxable  income  slightly,  but consistently, 
between  1960  and 1966,  and misses  by much  larger  amounts  in 1970  and 
1971.  Equation  (3) was also fitted  without  the capital  gains variable.  Al- 
though  this calculation  resulted  in a slightly  poorer  statistical  fit, the serial 
correlation  in the errors  was  less  pronounced,  and  the  residuals  in 1970  and 
1971,  in particular,  were significantly  smaller  than those in the equation 
presented  here. 
Waldorf's  equation  for tax liabilities  (T) is essentially  of the following 
form: 
(4)  T =  bo  rbli Zb2, 
where  r is the tax rate  for the first $2,000 of taxable  income. Joseph A. Pechman  419 
Table A-2. Actual, Predicted,  and Simulated  Values of Taxable Income and 
Tax Liabilities, 1954-71 
Billions  of dollars 
Tax liabilities 
obtained  from 
taxable income in 
Taxable income  Tax liabilities  equation  (3) 
Pre-  Simu- 
Year  Actual  Predicted  Residual  Actual  dicted  Residual  lated  Residual 
1954  115.3  116.1  -0.8  26.7  26.7  0.0  26.8  -0.  1 
1955  128.0  128.7  -0.7  29.6  29.6  0.0  29.7  -0.  1 
1956  141.5  140.4  1.1  32.7  32.7  0.0  32.4  0.3 
1957  149.4  147.5  1.9  34.4  34.5  -0.1  34.1  0.3 
1958  149.3  151.2  -1.9  34.3  34.5  -0.2  34.9  -0.6 
1959  166.5  166.0  0.5  38.6  38.4  0.2  38.3  0.3 
1960  171.6  174.4  -2.8  39.5  39.6  -0.1  40.2  -0.7 
1961  181.8  183.0  -1.2  42.2  41.9  0.3  42.2  0.0 
1962  195.3  196.2  -0.9  44.9  45.0  -0.1  45.2  -0.3 
1963  209.1  209.9  -0.8  48.2  48.2  0.0  48.4  -0.2 
1964  229.9  230.2  -0.3  47.2  47.3  -0.1  47.4  -0.2 
1965  255.1  256.1  -1.0  49.5  49.4  0.1  49.6  -0.  1 
1966  286.3  286.6  -0.3  56.1  56.2  -0.1  56.3  -0.2 
1967  315.1  312.8  2.3  62.9  62.6  0.3  62.1  0.8 
1968  352.8  350.5  2.3  71.5a  71.1  0.4  70.6  0.9 
1969  388.8  387.8  1.0  78.9a  79.3  -0.4  79.1  -0.2 
1970  401.2  397.1  4.1  81.8a  82.1  -0.3  81.2  0.6 
1971  414.1  418.5  -4.4  85.3  85.1  0.2  86.1  -0.8 
Sources: Actual, Statistics of Income, Individual  Income Tax Returns,  for the respective  years; other data. 
equations (3) and (6). 
a.  Excludes surcharge  of $5.2 billion in 1968, $7.7 billion in 1969, and $2.0 billion in 1970. 
As explained  in the  text,  Waldorf  needed  dummy  variables  to explain  the 
changes  in the tax rates  between  1947  and 1963.  In addition,  to account  for 
the increase  in the elasticity  of tax liabilities  with  respect  to taxable  income 
induced  by the 1964  revenue  act, Waldorf  estimated  tax liabilities  in two 
stages.  First,  he estimated  the equation  over  the 1947-63  period,  obtaining 
an elasticity  of 0.9955.  Second,  using  the results  of simulations  from  one of 
the earlier  tax  files,4  he calculated  the effective  rate  of tax on income  for the 
year 1965.  Finally,  a dummy  variable  for 1964  was constructed,  ex post, to 
complete  the equation. 
The Waldorf  tax liabilities  equation  estimated  in logarithmic  form over 
the 1947-63 period iS5 
4. See Pechman,  "A New Tax Model for Revenue  Estimating." 
5. This equation  also differs  from that presented  in Waldorf  (p. 9) because  it is fitted 
in terms of logarithms  to the base e rather  than to the base 10. 420  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1973 
log T -  log r =  0.2259 +  0.9955 log Z +  0.0221D47 
(103.7)  (3.3) 
(5)  +  0.0210D50  -  0.0262D51  - 0.0532D52_53  -0.0254D54-63. 
(3.1)  (3.7)  (8.0)  (6.9) 
k  = 0.999; standard  error  of estimate = 0.0055; 
Durbin-Watson  statistic = 3.03. 
Here,  the elasticity  of T with  respect  to r is constrained  to unity,  thus  per- 
mitting  r to be moved  to the left-hand  side of the equation. 
Although  the explanatory  power  of equation  (5) is reasonably  good, the 
residuals  are clearly  serially  correlated.  There  are also conceptual  difficul- 
ties associated  with the presence  of so many dummy  variables.  The esti- 
mates  were  improved  by confining  the period  of estimation  to 1954-71, by 
substituting  a new rate  variable  for the rate on the first  $2,000 of taxable 
income, and by introducing  another  taxable  income variable  to account 
for the rise  in the average  effective  tax rate  on taxable  income  beginning  in 
1965.  The resulting  equation,  which  was fitted  in logarithmic  form to the 
data for the years 1954-71,  is as follows: 
log T -  log R =  -0.7058  +  0.9950 log Z +  0.1280 log Za 
(137.9)  (12.8) 
(6)  +  0.6776D54-63. 
(12.5) 
0.999; standard  error  of estimate = 0.0040; 
Durbin-Watson  statistic = 2.55. 
Here,  R is an average  tax rate  computed  by weighting  the tax rates  for each 
bracket  in any year by the taxable  income in that bracket  in 1967. This 
variable,  which  is a more representative  proxy  for the tax rate structure, 
replaces  r in (5). The additional  taxable  income  variable,  log Zt, is set at 0 
prior  to 1964,  but is identical  to log Z thereafter.  The dummy  for 1954B63 
is needed  to account  for the peculiar  stability  in the effective  tax rate  dur- 
ing that period. 
The residuals  from  (6) and a related  simulation  are  shown  in Table  A-2. 
The  equation  fits  very  well,  with  the largest  error,  $0.4  billion,  occurring  in 
both 1968 and 1969. Even when  estimated  values  of Z from equation  (3) 
are used as the independent  variable  in (6), the tax liability  residuals  (last 
column)  remain  remarkably  small. 
Equation  (6) was also fitted  over the 1948-71  period,  but was modified 
by the addition  of a dummy  variable  for 1952B53  and another  taxable  in- Joseph A. Pechman  421 
come  variable,  log  Zb, which  assumed  the value  of 0 after  1954.  The  dummy 
was  used  to account  for the unusually  low amount  of capital  gains  in 1952- 
53. The variable  Zb was added  to test the hypothesis  that the rapid  rise in 
personal  incomes  between  1948-53  shifted  the elasticity  of T with respect 
to Z above 1. The resulting  equation  confirmed  this hypothesis;  in fact, 
the shift  in the  elasticity  between  1948-53  (0.13)  exceeded  the shift  recorded 
in 1965-71  (0.10)  by 3 percentage  points: 
log T -  log R =  -0.5712  +  0.9950 log Z +  0.1047 log Za 
(59.0)  (4.8) 
(7)  +  0.1310  log Zb +  0.5430D54-63- 0.0688D52653. 
(5.2)  (4.6)  (6.8) 
.2  = 0.999; standard  error  of estimate =  0.0095; 
Durbin-Watson  statistic = 2.760. 
Residuals  for this equation  exhibited  a greater  degree  of serial  correlation 
than those in (6), but were  generally  of the same  magnitude.  Equation  (7) 
was not used for projection  purposes,  however,  since  (6) provides  a more 
realistic  future  estimate  of the elasticity  of tax liabilities  with respect  to 
taxable  income. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Edward  Gramlich:  One of the great  turnabouts  in the past  few years  is the 
change  in the federal  budget  from a surplus-prone  to a deficit-prone  posi- 
tion. Whereas  in 1963  fiscal  advisers  were  worried  about full employment 
surpluses,  fiscal  drag,  and  finding  good uses  for the nation's  money,  in 1973 
advisers  are worried  much more about full employment  deficits,  infla- 
tionary  gaps, and finding  the money  for the nation's  uses. 
There  is, of course,  no mystery  about what happened.  Several  tax cuts 
and a very sharp  rise in expenditures,  domestic  as well as military,  have 
occurred  since  the fiscal  drag  days. But the phenomenon  that gave rise to 
the worry  about  fiscal  drag-the income  elasticity  of the federal  tax system 
-is  still important  precisely  because  the nation may want more tax cuts 
and higher  expenditures  in the future.  The ability  to forecast  this income 
elasticity  at least a few years  in advance  is important  because  the proper 
timing of these new initiatives  is important.  And it becomes especially 
desirable  to forecast  the elasticity  accurately  in times,  such  as the present, 
when  prices  and money  incomes  are rising  rapidly. 
Pechman's  paper handles  these questions  very competently  and com- 
pletely  for the individual  income  tax, the largest  and most difficult  tax to 
forecast.  He makes forecasts  in two ways-with  a two-equation  model 
beginning  with personal  income explaining  taxable  income and then tax 
liabilities,  and  with  a microsimulation  of a sample  of individual  tax returns 
for 1970. Both the regression  and the microsimulation  model are extrap- 
olated  all the way to 1995  under  varying  assumptions  about  the growth  of 
overall  money  income  and certain  of its key components. 
One  of the interesting  features  of the paper  is that  it provides  a chance  to 
compare  the two methods  of forecasting.  The assumptions  underlying  the 
regression  forecast  are that the structure  of both regressions  remains  the 
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same in the forecast  period-which is to say that the distribution  of per- 
sonal income  is the same  as some average  over  the regression  sample,  that 
the propensity  to itemize  deductions  does  not shift,  and  that  the increase  in 
the average  tax rate  due to progressivity  is the same  as in the period  since 
the 1964  tax cut. In the simulation  forecasts  the first  two of these  assump- 
tions  are  necessary  but not the third:  the time  series  effects  of rate  progres- 
sivity  can be calculated  exactly  from  the cross  section  of tax rates  for vari- 
ous incomes  in 1970. 
Pechman  finds  that the projections  of taxable  income,  and thus of com- 
ponents  of income  and the propensity  to itemize,  from forecasts  made in 
these  two different  ways  are  rather  close. But  the projections  of tax liabili- 
ties based on this taxable  income vary enormously:  they are $26 billion 
higher  in the microsimulation  by 1980  if money  personal  income  grows  at 
the not unreasonable  annual  rate  of 8 percent  until  then.  In other  words,  in 
just seven  years  the forecasting  difference  between  using  a microsimulation 
file and a tax liability  regression,  which  are  both quite  accurate  during  the 
sample  period,  is almost enough  to allow us to plan a Vietnam  War for 
1980 without  appreciably  altering  overall  fiscal policy. (Incidentally,  the 
regression  method  works  even better  than the simulation  file in the three 
years of the sample  period  for which Pechman  makes  comparative  fore- 
casts.) To say the least, it is not very reassuring  to a forecaster  that two 
methods  that give identically  accurate  past forecasts  give wildly  divergent 
forecasts  outside  of the sample  period. 
My only complaint  with  the paper  is that this key issue  is not discussed 
as extensively  as it should  have been. There  are several  possible  reasons 
for the divergence,  but my own prime  suspect  is the tax liability  regression 
(equation  6 in the appendix).  In fitting  this equation  Pechman  and Litan 
have computed  the effective  tax rate, R, by using  the 1967  importance  of 
various  taxable  income  brackets  to weight  the rates  in the various  brackets. 
This  technique  is much  to be preferred  to that used  by Waldorf,  which  was 
simply  to use the bottom bracket  rate and in effect  ignore  changes  at all 
other  points  in the rate  scale.  And it does fit the past data  well. But it still 
may leave something  to be desired  when  used for forecasting.  As income 
grows over time, more of it will be shifted  into the higher-rate  brackets, 
thus raising  the weights  that should  be applied  to the higher  rates  in the 
scale and average  tax rates.  Pechman  and Litan  capture  this phenomenon 
by permitting  taxable  income  to have  an elasticity  greater  than one, which 
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are not smooth-and the sharp  divergence  in projected  values  of tax lia- 
bilities  indicates  they may not be-the  elasticity  of taxable  income  might 
change  beyond  the sample  period  and pose difficulties  for the regression 
forecast.  One way to get around  the problem  is with a Pechman-type 
microsimulation;  another  would  be to try to work out some scheme  for 
changing  the weights  in R during  the estimation  and then the extrapola- 
tion period.  The latter  approach  would  by no means  be easy; indeed,  one 
could  say that it just shifts  the problem  from  fitting  the regression  to find- 
ing the way  to construct  R, but there  may  be some  payoff  in experimenting 
with such an approach. 
Oswald  Brownlee:  The economics  profession  is indebted  to Joe Pechman 
for introducing  and gaining  acceptance  for the kind of simulation  used in 
this paper  to estimate  the effects  of changes  in the tax structure  on income 
distribution  and  tax revenues.  This  paper  demonstrates  the tax yield  possi- 
bilities  of the federal  individual  income  tax if its present  rate,  exemption, 
and preference  structure  were  to be maintained.  By 1995,  with an annual 
growth  rate  of 4 percent  in per  capita  income,  the average  marginal  tax rate 
would  rise  to more  than 25 percent.  With  an average  tax rate  of about 17 
percent,  this would yield tremendous  revenues-more than $400 billion. 
Of course,  the individual  income  tax structure  is unlikely  to remain  un- 
changed.  Although  I am quite  sure  that Congress  follows  no rule  that per- 
sonal income  tax should  always  be aimed  at about 10 percent  of personal 
income,  it has seen  fit to reduce  the rates,  raise  the exemptions,  or increase 
personal  deductions  as income  has risen,  so that the average  individual  in- 
come  tax collections  have  remained  approximately  constant  at this  level  for 
quite a long time. I expect a comparable  course  of action in the future. 
Consequently,  Pechman's  results  should  be interpreted-and  I believe  this 
is also his interpretation-as  the leeway  that Congress  will have  in altering 
the rate structure,  exemptions,  and deductions  in the future. 
Although  the built-in  flexibilities-the derivatives  of total individual  in- 
come taxes collected  with respect  to adjusted  personal  income-increase 
with income, the elasticities  all diminish.  Obviously,  this is because  the 
average  tax rate  is rising  faster  than  the marginal  rate.  If the marginal  rate 
were  constant,  and  the  constant  of the  tax function  as it is related  to income 
were  negative,  the range  of positive  values  for elasticities  would begin at 
plus infinity  and converge  toward  one. 
The yield estimates  are in nominal  terms so that any combination  of Joseph A. Pechman  425 
rates  of increase  in real income  and in the price  level that add to a given 
rate of increase  in nominal  income will provide  the corresponding  com- 
puted  yields,  weighted  marginal  rates,  and average  rates  shown  in the ta- 
bles. The tax yield effects  of inflation  and real income growth  are indis- 
tinguishable,  except  on the basis of specific  assumptions  about  changes  in 
the distribution  of income (as between  wages and profits,  in Pechman's 
example). 
I am somewhat  perplexed  by the suggestion  that "if the exemptions  and 
the tax brackets  were  adjusted  to eliminate  this real  tax increase,  the rev- 
enue lost could be recovered  by increasing  the tax rates  by an average  of 
3.1 percentage  points in each bracket."  I thought that the objective  of 
adjusting  rates and exemptions  to account  for the inflation  was to make 
the real  tax take depend  upon real income  and thus be invariant  with re- 
spect  to the inflation  rate.  In fact, if rates  were  increased  by the same  per- 
centage  in each  bracket  and  the increase  restored  the government's  revenue 
loss, the two adjustments  would  approximately  cancel  each  other  for every 
taxpayer. 
I do not believe  that  the implication  that  higher  marginal  tax rates  result 
in greater  stability  in the behavior  of income  with  respect  to certain  exog- 
enous shocks  is correct.  It is true  that the static  multiplier  of income  with 
respect  to an exogenous  expenditure  change  generally  is smaller  with  higher 
marginal  tax rates  than  it is with  lower  ones, but the actual  variance  in the 
movement  of income  over time may be larger  with higher  values  for the 
built-in  stabilizer  than with lower  values.  Obviously,  if the correlation  be- 
tween  the disturbance  and the so-called  stabilizer  is small,  as would  be the 
case if the period  of the disturbance  is shorter  than the time required  for 
taxes  to react  to income,  the variance-minimizing  marginal  tax rate  could 
be zero. 
General  Discussion 
The issues  of inflation  and built-in  stability  elicited  comments  from  sev- 
eral of the conference  members.  Robert J. Gordon noted that economic 
and demographic  groups  are affected  differently  by inflation  and real in- 
come growth,  although  the tax revenues  generated  by the two processes 
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effective  tax rates  fairly  uniformly,  inflation  imposes  uneven  tax increases 
which  depend  upon the sources  of personal  income and wealth.  Gordon 
referred  to homeowners  with prenegotiated  mortgages  as an example  of 
individuals  who are  trapped  into effective  tax increases  because  they  cannot 
alter  their  behavior  rapidly  enough.  In response,  Pechman  said  that  he had 
been interested  primarily  in the effects of inflation  on different  income 
levels.  He remarked  that the tax file could be used to study  the impact  of 
inflation  on different  demographic  groups. 
George  Perry  noted that it was incorrect  to view  the automatic  revenue 
increase  coming  from  inflation  as another  aspect  of the U.S. tax system  as 
an automatic  stabilizer.  The built-in  flexibility  of the tax with respect  to 
cyclical  variations  in real  incomes  acts  as an automatic  stabilizer  because  it 
works both ways: it supports  income when the economy  falls below the 
trend  line and restricts  it when the economy  rises above trend. Thus, it 
dampens  cyclical  variations  in real incomes.  But the built-in  flexibility  of 
the tax with respect  to inflation  is asymmetrical.  Tax revenues  increase  as 
prices  rise  in an inflation  but they do not fall correspondingly  when  infla- 
tion ends-except in the unlikely  event  that  prices  fall  to their  original  level. 
As a result,  the response  of revenues  to inflation  makes  for a permanent 
transfer  of income  to the public  sector  which  must  be followed  by a discre- 
tionary  reduction  in tax rates  if the same real tax level is to obtain after 
inflation  has subsided. 
Several  participants  expanded  on Gramlich's  comments  on the specifica- 
tion of the regression  model. Lawrence  Klein argued  that the R variable 
should  have  been  specified  differently.  He thought  that  the regression  model 
had performed  well over the sample  period  because  the first  rate bracket 
had been  dominant,  as was  the case  in the Brown-Kruizenga  paper.  But  for 
the future,  a specification  that allowed  R to vary  with income  distribution 
could be expected  to predict  better. 
Charles  Holt and Stephen  Goldfeld  asked whether  Pechman  had con- 
sidered  combining  the tax and  the regression  models.  Holt suggested  that  it 
would  be possible  to use data  from  the tax bank  about  different  exemption 
levels,  rules  about  deductions,  and  similar  variables  to generate  predictions 
from the tax model about tax collections  at different  rates and income 
levels.  These  predictions  could  then  be put  into a regression  model  in order 
to estimate  the effects of such things as rate changes. Goldfeld asked 
whether  it would  not be possible  to translate  the tax file's  adjustments  for 
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relevant  variables  into simple  changes  in the variables  of such  a regression 
equation.  The regression  model would approximate  the structural  char- 
acteristics  obtainable  from  the tax file  but would  be easier  to use. Pechman 
answered  that a simple  formula  could probably  be developed,  and agreed 
that the type of analysis  suggested  by Holt and Goldfeld  would  be worth- 
while.  He noted  that this kind of analysis  might  be similar  to respecifying 
R in a more complex way, as Gramlich  and Klein had suggested,  and 
would  bring  the regression  projections  closer  to those obtainable  with  the 
tax file. 
Thomas  Juster  noted  that  the specific  behavior  that determined  the rela- 
tion of deductions  to income  was hard  to project.  The growth  of home- 
ownership,  for example,  was the single  most important  factor  behind  the 
growth  of deductions.  He added  that it could be difficult  to include  ex- 
plicitly  in a forecasting  model the complex  of forces  that affect  itemizing 
behavior, and that any assumption  about it-such  as Pechman's  as- 
sumption  that deductions  have  an elasticity  of 1.05  with  respect  to income 
-could  not be considered  very  reliable. 
Murray Weidenbaum  noted the importance  of pursuing Pechman's 
analysis  to generate  revenue  estimates.  He added  that the second  stage of 
analysis,  estimating  tax withholdings,  should  be relatively  easy;  estimating 
personal  tax liabilities,  which  Pechman  does, is usually  the greatest  source 
of error  and surprise  in revenue  estimating. 